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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
  
CNIL La Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (France) 
CoE Council of Europe 
DDOS Distributed denial of service (attack) 
E2E End-to-End 
ECI European Citizens’ Initiative 
EFFI Electronic Frontier Finland 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Studies 
NVT New voting technology/ies 
OAS Organisation of American States 
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Rec(2004)11 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on legal, 
operational and technical standards for e-voting was adopted by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 30 September 2004 
U.S. EAC United States Election Assistance Commission 
VVPAT Voter verified paper audit trail 
VVSG Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (U.S.) 
ZKP Zero-Knowledge Proofs  
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Executive Summary 
The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on legal, operational 
and technical standards for e-voting was adopted on 30 September 2004. It became rapidly a 
reference for Council of Europe States that introduce or envisage introducing e-voting. Being 
the only international instrument to legally regulate e-voting, the Recommendation has also 
been referenced by other organisations and countries outside the region.  
In the light of e-voting practical experiences, it was rapidly felt that the Recommendation 
needed some adjustments. Two sets of Guidelines were adopted offering practical tools to 
facilitate the implementation of the recommendations on certification and transparency. 
Further reflection and experiences brought experts to the conclusion that a formal update is 
needed which allows for a thorough rethink and redesign of the Recommendation in the 
light of today's understanding of e-voting.  
The main arguments in favour of an update include lessons learned by experimenting with e-
voting or by observing it, critical assessments of the Recommendation as well as technology 
developments. After considering the implications of a non-update, we recommend a revision 
in line with the needs resulting from the e-voting development since 2004. The revision must 
ensure that the Recommendation is up-to-date, balanced and responsive to ongoing devel-
opments. A revised Recommendation would allow the Council of Europe to maintain its posi-
tion as a recognised and cutting-edge actor in the field of e-voting. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a follow-up to the fourth biennial meeting of the Council of Europe (CoE) to review Rec-
ommendation Rec(2004)11 on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting, here-
after referred to as the Recommendation or as Rec(2004)11, which took place in July 2012 in 
Bregenz as well as to a Ministers' Deputies Rapporteur Group on Democracy meeting of 4 
July 2013, the Division of Electoral Assistance and Census at the Directorate of Democracy of 
the Council of Europe mandated the present report.  
The mandate specifies that the report shall comprise "a factual analysis of the current im-
plementation by the Council of Europe member States of the Committee of Ministers 
Rec(2004)11 on legal, operational and technical standards of e-voting and a proposal for a 
possible update of the recommendation in the light of individual countries' practical experi-
ence, technological advances and emergence of new concepts since the adoption of the in-
strument". 
In accordance with the mandate, we identified three questions to examine, the second one 
being the central question: How has Rec(2004)11 been developed and implemented so far? 
Has an update become necessary following practical experience, technological advances and 
emergence of new concepts? How to proceed with a possible update? The main purpose of 
the report is to assess the need for updating the Recommendation. This will contribute to 
the Council of Europe planning in this field. 
In preparing the report we considered the following information: the follow-up work to 
Rec(2004)11 of the Council of Europe, the evaluation of e-voting experiences in CoE coun-
tries, the regulatory work in the field of e-voting by other organizations, academic research 
and industry reports. After a short historical reminder, we review the implementation of the 
Recommendation by member States and its referencing by other organizations (chapter 2). A 
number of reasons for an update are identified in this chapter already. Next (chapter 3) we 
discuss update proposals. They originate, among others, from critical assessments of the 
Recommendation and technology developments. The purpose of a possible update and the 
necessary expertise to conduct it are also briefly discussed. We also reflect (chapter 4) on 
the implications of a non-update, before finishing (chapter 5) by presenting some recom-
mendations on how to tackle the updating of Rec(2004)11. 
2. REC(2004)11 
2.1 Introduction  
2.1.1 Rationale and objectives 
Rec(2004)11 is addressed to the CoE member States. The Committee of Ministers also took 
note of the Explanatory Memorandum thereto1 presented by the Multidisciplinary Ad Hoc 
Group of Specialists on legal, operational and technical standards for e-enabled voting, the 
ad-hoc group which compiled both documents.  
                                                     
1 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Del/Dec%282004%29898/1.5b&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&
Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864  
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E-voting is defined in the Recommendation as an e-election or e-referendum that involves 
the use of electronic means at least in the casting of the vote. It will be used in the same 
sense in this document, covering both e-voting in controlled (e.g. voting machines in polling 
stations) and in uncontrolled environments (e.g. internet voting from a private computer).  
The rationale for introducing Rec(2004)11 can be summarized as follows: "(i) apply the prin-
ciples of democratic elections to e-voting, (ii) provide member states with a comprehensive 
checklist for all stages of the electoral process, (iii) set minimum standards for remote and 
non-remote e-voting and (iv) promote and ensure interoperability of e-voting systems" 
(Remmert, 2006). Minimum standards were expected to be used as benchmarks by coun-
tries helping them to create a sound legal basis for e-voting. Rec(2004)11 was expected to be 
followed by the ICT industry.  
Considering the historical development of e-voting which in Europe started already in the 
sixties it can be inferred that Rec(2004)11 was prompted by increasing awareness of the 
necessity to legally regulate the use of e-voting. The adoption of common standards at the 
international level was considered key to guaranteeing the respect of all the principles of 
democratic elections and referendums when using e-voting (Remmert, 2004: 13).  
There existed few examples of e-voting legislation at the time. One example was the Swiss 
Federal Ordinance on Political Rights, articles 27a ff. which had been introduced in Septem-
ber 2002 to regulate the use of internet and SMS voting2. Several provisions in the Recom-
mendation are very similar to art. 27a ff. of the Ordinance. The adoption of the Recommen-
dation was also preceded by a European Commission for Democracy through Law, alias Ven-
ice Commission, report (2004) on distant voting and internet voting. 
Rec(2004)11 is a pioneer effort which attempts to apply a finite but not consolidated num-
ber of legal requirements for democratic elections, dispatched in a set of international in-
struments only some of which are mentioned at the beginning of the Recommendation, to 
an indefinite number of voting solutions that (only) share one common characteristic: the 
use of electronics in casting the vote. 
The CoE Recommendation is the first and so far only international instrument to legally regu-
late e-voting. Other organisations have developed other e-voting related instruments (see 
point 2.4). This body of knowledge is often referred to as emerging standards for electronic 
voting. 
2.1.2 Structure and content 
The Recommendation contains five recommendations (i. to v.) and some definitions. The five 
recommendations refer to and are followed by the Appendices I to III. The appendices con-
tain the legal (I) and operational standards (II) and the technical requirements (III). The list of 
standards and requirements is considered to be non-exhaustive. The explanatory memoran-
dum is not part of the Recommendation strictly speaking. However it provides valuable in-
formation and an insight into the historical context.  
The starting point for the Rec(2004)11 is the observation that "member states are already 
using, or considering using e-voting for a number of purposes" and that "only those e-voting 
systems which are secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to independent verifica-
                                                     
2 Ordonnance sur les droits politiques (RS 161.11), Available: http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/19780105/201206010000/161.11.pdf [29 Nov 2013] 
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tion and easily accessible to voters will build the public confidence which is a pre-requisite for 
holding e-voting". 
The recommendations to member states are three: (i) e-voting shall respect all the principles 
of democratic elections and referendums and be as reliable and secure as democratic elec-
tions and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means; (ii) the intercon-
nection between the legal, operational and technical aspects of e-voting, as set out in the 
Appendices, has to be taken into account when applying the Recommendation and (iii) 
member states should consider reviewing their relevant domestic legislation in the light of 
this Recommendation and within the limits stated by recommendation iv.  
The request for a review meeting two years after the adoption is made "in order to provide 
the Council of Europe with a basis for possible further action on e-voting" (v). For the purpose 
of the review it is recommended that member states keep under review their policy on, and 
experience of e-voting, and in particular the implementation of the provisions of this Rec-
ommendation; and report to the Secretariat the results of their reviews.  
The Recommendation is neutral with respect to the introduction of e-voting. It does not rec-
ommend member states to introduce e-voting, although it recognises that "as new informa-
tion and communication technologies are increasingly being used in day-to-day life, member 
states need to take account of these developments in their democratic practice". And it also 
expects e-voting to increase participation, improve access for disabled citizens or those re-
siding or staying abroad, reduce overall costs over time, deliver voting results reliably and 
more quickly, provide the electorate with a better service, etc. 
2.2 Follow-up and development 
2.2.1 Biennial meetings 
The Council of Europe has convened four biennial expert meetings so far: in 2006, 2008, 
2010 and 2012. Member States have reported on their policy on, and experience of, e-
voting. The meetings have provided a platform for considering developments in the field of 
e-voting at the European level. 
The first review meeting in 2006 reconfirmed that the Recommendation was accepted by 
member States as a valid benchmark by which to assess and evaluate e-voting systems. Par-
ticipants agreed that further research and attention should be dedicated to the issues of 
accreditation and certification of e-voting systems and to the development of guidelines on 
the observation of e-enabled elections. 
That same year the CoE (2006b) organized a conference in Estonia on lessons learned and 
future challenges. The issue of verification by the voter of the e-voting results was qualified 
as a crucial question and legal problem. 
At the second review meeting in 2008 member states agreed that the Recommendation on 
e-voting was still accurate and useful. However, the experts felt that in the light of experi-
ences and developments in the field of e-voting it was useful to develop some additional 
comments to certain parts of the Recommendation, such as certification and observation. 
Consequently, two sets of new guidelines were approved at the third review meeting in 
2010 : one on transparency of e-enabled elections and the other on certification of e-voting 
systems (CoE, 2011a and 2011b). Prepared by the Secretariat with input from representa-
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tives of interested member states and academic experts, the texts were endorsed by the 
participants as providing a common reference. It was stressed that they needed to be 
viewed as work in progress since the practical experiences in the field of e-voting were in 
constant evolution. In addition, a practical guide on the introduction of e-voting prepared by 
the Secretariat was also endorsed. "Guidelines" are defined as documents aiming at stream-
lining particular processes according to a set routine, but without being mandatory (see Ap-
pendix 1 in both documents).  
Participants at the forth review meeting in 2012 expressed concerns that “bearing in mind 
the practical experience, technological advances and emergence of new concepts since the 
adoption... the Recommendation adopted in 2004 does not comprehensively address a num-
ber of significant issues and contains some ambiguities in its provisions and in the explana-
tory memorandum…(T)he Recommendation would benefit from a clearer distinction between 
provisions relating to non-remote machine voting in polling stations and to remote e-voting 
over the internet. Participants also pointed to some tension in the Recommendation between 
recommendations of a high-level and those that address issues in great detail...(T)he repre-
sentatives of Member States present at the review meeting ... agreed to recommend that 
(the Recommendation) should be formally updated" (CoE, 2012). 
Under the high patronage of the CoE, biennial academic conferences were held since 2004 in 
Bregenz, Austria that presented an interdisciplinary approach to e-voting developments 
worldwide. European experiences have been extensively discussed. The conference pro-
ceedings3 give a good overview on the fast development of e-voting in the past years. 
The 2008 conference highlighted several issues considered new in comparison to traditional 
voting including observation of voting and counting through a computer, the guarantee of a 
transparent election when people vote on a machine, the security and the legal aspects. Cer-
tification and transparency were two other topics. The highly interdisciplinary needs when 
dealing with e-voting were underlined.  
So-called end-to-end (or E2E) verifiable schemes were presented in 2010. Specific sessions 
were dedicated to certification of e-voting systems and to E2E verifiability. 
The 2012 conference dealt with "challenges to electronic voting: transparency, trust and 
voter education". Verification was discussed in depth, from different perspectives and as 
applied in different contexts such as in Norway. Auditing and testing of e-voting systems was 
another topic. For the first time, the CoE biennial review meeting was organised back to back 
with the Bregenz conference. 
From our point of view, these multiple developments show the need for common references 
and the fact that the Recommendation timely responded to it, rapidly becoming a reference 
in the e-voting regulation field. They also show that in the light of experiences, practitioners 
felt rapidly the need to adjust the Recommendation. Efforts were initially directed into com-
pleting it by adding two sets of Guidelines. Further reflection and new developments have 
brought experts to the conclusion that a formal update is needed which allows for a thor-
ough rethink and redesign of the Recommendation to reflect today's understanding of e-
voting. 
                                                     
3 http://www.e-voting.cc/en/publications/proceedings/ [29 Nov 2013] 
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2.2.2 Guidelines on certification 
One of the first questions when introducing e-voting is how to make sure that prescribed 
requirements and standards are effectively implemented. The guidelines on certification aim 
at providing a practical tool to facilitate the implementation of the 2004 Recommendation, 
in particular paragraphs 111 and 112 which recommend member states to introduce certifi-
cation processes that allow for any IT component to be tested and certified as being in con-
formity with the technical requirements described. The term certification as used in the 
guidelines means "a process of confirmation that an e-voting system is in compliance with 
prescribed requirements and standards and that it at least includes provisions to ascertain 
the correct functioning of the system" (CoE, 2011a).  
The core challenge is mentioned in guideline §3 : "Member states should ascertain that all 
technical requirements fully reflect the relevant legal and democratic principles". The text 
focuses on two issues: (i) making sure that (ii) all technical requirements fully reflect the law. 
In other words it focuses on certification (making sure) of the full compliance (all technical 
requirements fully reflect the law). A third important point is implied in order for full compli-
ance to make sense: all pertinent legal requirements must be respected.  
This poses the question of the exhaustivity of the international principles on democratic 
elections mentioned in the Recommendation. Indeed it is important when certifying to have 
a complete list of requirements against which to check the conformity of a given system. 
There will always be room for interpretation of Rec(2004)11 and for more detailed regula-
tion at the national level. But the list itself, in this case, of international principles on democ-
ratic elections applicable to voting systems, needs to be exhaustive. 
Peruse and re-use of certification is foreseen (guideline §10). It will help countries and indus-
tries to certify and to do it possibly at reasonable costs. To be seriously taken into account, 
the concepts of peruse and re-use in a given country of a certification obtained in another 
country imply that the certification indicates compliance with a, possibly exhaustive, list of 
international requirements for democratic elections applicable to voting systems, contained 
preferably in one international instrument (such as the Recommendation) previously ap-
proved by the given country's responsible authority (the Government for Rec(2004)11). 
Thus, with respect to certification, it's important to have a complete and coherent list of 
standards. As mentioned above, the Recommendation does not contain such a list. 
2.2.3 Guidelines on transparency  
Even in countries where the public trusts the electoral system and its administration, the 
introduction of e-voting has proved challenging. So, in addition to the fundamental issue of 
the trustworthiness of the e-voting solution itself, one important question relates to addi-
tional measures to foster trust and confidence. 
The guidelines on transparency (CoE, 2011b) aim at providing a practical tool to facilitate the 
implementation especially of recommendations 20 to 23 which invite member states to en-
sure the transparency of their voting system. Transparency is defined in the guidelines as 
"the concept of determining how and why information is conveyed through various means". 
The guidelines on transparency introduce new concepts which reflect practical experiences. 
One is "the use of a second medium to store the vote to improve transparency" (§13 applica-
ble to e-voting in polling stations) and the related "mandatory count of the second medium 
in a statistically meaningful number of randomly selected polling stations" (§14) and specific 
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"rules dealing with discrepancies between the mandatory count of the second medium and 
the official electronic results" (§15). However, the use of a second medium to store the vote 
is not simply a way to ensure transparency as it affects the organisation of the voting. 
Another new concept is introduced in §16 which requires countries to "gain experience in 
providing mechanisms that allow voters to check whether their vote was counted as in-
tended". Also the concept of "chain of trust in e-enabled elections" is introduced according to 
which voters should be able to verify if their vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast and 
counted as recorded. This introduces a new possibility for the voter to prove that their own 
single vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast and counted as recorded. This possibility 
does not exist in other, non-electronic, voting systems in relation to a specific vote.  
Such concepts, although inspired by traditional voting, are new. They are specific to e-voting 
and appear today as necessary to ensure that the public can place the same trust in e-voting 
as in other non electronic voting systems. 
Norway considered the ability to independently verify that the system accurately reflects the 
will of the voters in the results that it produces as an important feature for Internet voting 
system. Accordingly, and in addition to transparency measures such as publication of docu-
ments and of source code, Norway introduced new mechanisms in its internet voting solu-
tion. The most discussed are software independent E2E verification that includes Zero-
Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) for the final cleansing and mixing stages and the so-called return 
codes, whose purpose is to allow individual verifiability that the Internet voting system has 
received the vote as cast by the voter from the voting client (Barrat et al., 2012a). These are 
new technical possibilities mainly based on cryptography. Discussion on their merits and 
development is ongoing.  
As usual with experimenting, practice has so far preceded regulation. However we are now 
at a point where there exists a certain consensus on their use and they are being introduced 
in a number of countries4. Such new concepts and mechanisms being legally relevant, they 
need to be defined and their use regulated by law. So far no legal basis exists at the CoE 
level. The general requirements of transparency in the Recommendation and Guidelines do 
not regulate the implementation, control, etc. of such mechanisms. 
As research on the compatibility of return codes used in Norway with Rec(2004)11 shows, a 
literal interpretation of the Recommendation may suggest the conclusion that return codes 
contradict its requirements. A more subtle interpretation, however, concluded that return 
codes may meet the Council of Europe’s recommendations (Barrat, Goldsmith, 2012b). 
When considering regulation of such new mechanisms, their impact on the whole system of 
democratic elections and referendums as well as the way to deal with complaints need to be 
considered. Whether and to what extent such regulation can be introduced in the Recom-
mendation itself should be explored. The Recommendation could be the right instrument to 
introduce minimum standards to provide guidance to member states. 
                                                     
4 E.g. Estonia and several Swiss cantons. 
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2.3 Implementation  
2.3.1 By countries 
The recommendation recommends the governments two things: to comply with its require-
ments and to consider reviewing domestic legislation in the light of the Recommendation.  
It can be safely said that all CoE countries that conduct or envisage conducting e-voting look 
towards the Recommendation for guidance at least at the implementation level, if not at the 
regulatory level. In particular internet voting systems were either conceived or updated by 
incorporating the CoE Recommendation (U.S. EAC, 2011). This was the case in Estonia, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Presumably this is also the case for more recent e-
voting developments in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Ro-
mania and Spain as the (CoE, 2012) report suggests.  
Compliance with Rec(2004)11 and adjustment of national legislation in the light of the Rec-
ommendation to regulate e-voting has been monitored by the administrations themselves, 
by OSCE/ODIHR or by researchers. Below we'll present some examples. 
Norway is so far the only country to have given Rec(2004)11 legal status by incorporating its 
recommendations (with few exceptions) into the regulatory framework of both 2011 and 
2013 internet voting trials (Norway, 2011 and 2013). The Regulations laid down by the Nor-
wegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development Relating to Trial Electronic 
Voting at the 2011 municipal and county council elections stipulate that the Council of 
Europe's Rec(2004)11 relating to legal, operational and technical standards for e-enabled 
voting shall form the basis of these trials, unless otherwise specified in these Regulations and 
in the Election Act. However some of the recommendations were excluded and Norway also 
introduced verification mechanisms which are not dealt with in the Rec(2004)11 such as re-
turn codes.  
Norway has offered good examples of e-voting transparency during the 2011 and 2013 trials. 
In addition to publishing several documents and the source code, the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment has held international conferences with the participation of international electoral 
experts interested in e-voting. This has allowed for an open discussion of the Norwegian e-
voting solution in the light of emerging international standards on e-voting.  
The Norwegian system has also been specifically evaluated for its conformity to Rec(2004)11 
by independent researchers (Barrat and Goldsmith, 2012b). The evaluation concludes that 
"(a)s a package, the Council of Europe Recommendations represents a very comprehensive 
and detailed set of standards for the conduct of electronic voting. For the Norwegian Internet 
voting system to fully comply with 85 of the 102 relevant recommendations and only be non-
compliant with three recommendations, is a significant achievement given the exacting na-
ture of the Council of Europe Recommendations". The evaluation also provides a critical 
feedback on the Rec(2004)11 itself that we will consider below.  
Belgium Federal and Regional Administrations commissioned a thorough study on e-voting 
(BeVoting, 2007). Rec(2004)11 is largely referenced in the study and serves as the main 
benchmark for evaluating e-voting (first part of the study) as well as for proposing a set of 
technical requirements for a new e-voting system in Belgium (second part of the study). 
In Estonia the Recommendation has been considered by the judge when examining the right 
to change the e-vote and more generally the constitutionality of e-voting. The Estonian Na-
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tional Court considered the right to change the e-vote as a precondition of constitutionality 
of e-voting, without which the principle of free voting cannot be guaranteed by remote 
Internet voting. The Court then explained that the right to change the e-vote is in accor-
dance with the CoE Recommendation (Madise and Vinkel, 2011). 
Finland's use of voting machines in polling stations has been monitored in the light of 
Rec(2004)11 by both Electronic Frontier Finland (Electronic Frontier Finland, 2009) - a Fin-
nish non-profit - and the Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
(Whitmore, 2008).  
France's e-voting from an uncontrolled environment must comply with the National Com-
mission on Informatics and Liberties (CNIL) recommendations (CNIL, 2010). The structure of 
the CNIL 2010 recommendations differs from Rec(2004)11. However there are many com-
monalities. CNIL points out that compared to 2003 (first edition of the recommendations), 
when e-voting was at its very beginning, e-voting from controlled and uncontrolled envi-
ronments has moved and expanded so fast that the recommendations needed to be 
amended and a second edition issued in 2010. 
The implementation of electronic voting in Ireland was evaluated against emerging interna-
tional standards on e-voting, specifically, the legal and operational standards and technical 
requirements for e-voting contained in Rec(2004)11 (Commission on Electronic Voting, 
2004). This despite the fact that Rec(2004)11 post-dated to the adoption of the Irish e-voting 
system.  
Swiss federal legislation on e-voting from uncontrolled environments introduced in 2002 and 
Rec(2004)11 present many commonalities (Conseil fédéral, 2013.) in their content. The Fed-
eral Ordinance has been recently modified to reflect lessons learned during the past ten 
years5. According to official explanations the provisions of the Ordinance have been reduced 
to the essential. More detailed technical requirements have been integrated in a new Tech-
nical Regulation issued by the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Government's entity respon-
sible for political rights at the federal level. This will allows for speedy and flexible amend-
ments of the Technical Regulation to reflect technology developments. The main new con-
cept - E2E verifiability - is regulated in the Ordinance (approved by the Government). The 
Law on political rights (approved by Parliament) will presumably be modified if and when e-
voting is generalized and liberalized, which is not yet the case.  
OSCE/ODIHR has monitored the use of e-voting or new voting technologies (NVT) in elec-
tions in different CoE countries. Its reports provide valuable information on the implementa-
tion of the Recommendation as well as on the legal framework for e-voting in the countries. 
ODIHR often interprets and gives substance to high-level recommendations. E.g. when, 
based on the broad recommendations 107 and 108, it recommended Belgium to introduce 
legislation on voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or an equivalent verification procedure 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2007, Belgium).  
ODIHR'S recommendation to France (2012) that the authorities consider the use of a verifia-
ble internet voting scheme or an equally reliable mechanism for voters to check whether or 
not their votes were cast as intended reflects recent technical developments. However such 
recommendation is not backed by Rec(2004)11 as it stands today but only by the Guidelines 
on transparency. Rec(2004)11 has to be amended accordingly to fulfill its role as the legal 
benchmark for such a recommendation. 
                                                     
5 The new version is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2014. The proposed new version is available at: 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/gg/pc/ind2013.html#ChF [29 Nov 2013] 
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ODIHR regularly recommends that legal provisions with regards to all stages of internet vot-
ing are further detailed and consolidated in the national law (see 2011/2012 reports on Es-
tonia, Norway, Switzerland and France). An updated Rec(2004)11 would help national gov-
ernments and legislators with this task. 
In some cases, the same recommendation is implemented in opposing ways by different 
countries in accordance with their own specificities. This is the case with "secrecy and free-
dom of the vote" (recommendations 9 to 19). Norway and Estonia have introduced multiple 
voting, or a right to change the e-vote for internet voters alone (although this literally con-
tradicts recommendation 5) as well as a precedence of paper ballots over electronic ballots. 
France and Switzerland do not allow multiple voting and assign the same value to a validly 
issued ballot, be it on paper or electronic. Norway and Estonia use this means to offer the 
voter a way to get around voting coercion and vote buying. France’s and Switzerland’s point 
of view is that internet voting is just another form of distant voting from an uncontrolled 
environment, and that coercion will not be addressed differently for internet voting than for 
postal voting. Whether remote voting from uncontrolled environments is acceptable when 
considering the possibility of coercion, and, if yes, under which conditions, this is decided 
elsewhere (e.g. Venice Commission opinions). ODIHR encourages France and Switzerland to 
introduce multiple voting but says nothing on the impact this would have on the system as a 
whole given the inequality it will create with other channels and the fact that not all voters 
have access to internet voting (due to a step-by-step approach in e-voting introduction, at 
least in Switzerland, which in turn is considered to be a good practice by ODIHR). 
The last example illustrates several things. First, the need to take into account the whole 
electoral system of a country. Secondly, some issues are strictly related to e-voting while 
others, such as multiple voting, even if they are introduced in an e-voting context, are a mat-
ter of public policy not of voting technology. Their introduction affects the whole system. 
Thirdly, the importance of having an exhaustive list of requirements that reflect interna-
tional standards for democratic elections and that apply to all voting channels and to all CoE 
member countries. We will add a fourth point: issues such as secrecy and freedom cannot be 
examined the same way whether we consider e-voting in controlled or in uncontrolled envi-
ronments. The distinction between these two categories has to be taken into account. 
Austria used the Recommendation to evaluate and certify an Internet voting system used in 
a pilot for student council elections. Rec(2004)11 was used as a baseline for the project, with 
additional requirements created by Austria’s Parliament. The Austrian experience provided 
valuable feedback for an update of the Recommendations as we will see below (see 3.1.1). 
Outside the CoE region, the Recommendation is referenced in particular when considering 
introduction of e-voting regulation or standards. A recently published research study com-
missioned by Elections Canada (Schwartz and Grice, 2013) considers the work done by CoE in 
this field as the most extensive while creating a legal framework for a new technology. It 
recommends election officials in Canada to consider referencing the Rec(2004)11 check-list. 
The US Electoral Assistance Commission has also referenced the Recommendation in an ef-
fort to locate standards and requirements on internet voting utilized elsewhere in the world 
which include voting specific functionality, accessibility and security requirements (U.S. EAC, 
2011). 
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2.3.2 By industry 
Scytl, a European internet voting solutions and service provider, has published its evaluation 
of the compatibility of its solution with Rec(2004)11 in December 2004. More specifically, 
Scytl has evaluated the compliance of "Pnyx" with security standards 77 to 99 and with stan-
dards 100 to 110 on audit . For each standard a brief explanation of compliance is provided 
by Scytl.  
There exist other examples of self-measurement of compliance with Rec(2004)11 by provid-
ers of e-voting solutions, be they private firms or public administrations. To ensure imple-
mentation of Rec(2004)11 it is important that certification (and other types of controls) of e-
voting systems towards the Recommendation are conducted by an independent and compe-
tent body.  
2.4 Regulations and guidelines by other organizations  
The emerging international electoral standards on e-voting are struggling to catch up with 
the introduction of technology into the voting and counting process (Barrat and Goldsmith, 
2012b). Several organisations have produced guidelines on e-voting introduction and obser-
vation. Organisations such as the OSCE/ODIHR (2013), the Organization of American States 
(2010), the Carter Center (2012) and the National Democratic Institute for International Af-
fairs (Pran and Merloe, 2008) have approached the issue of standards for electronic voting 
and counting technologies from the perspective of election observers. A document from IFES 
(Goldsmith, 2011) is interesting from a regulatory point of view as it presents a comprehen-
sive overview of international electoral standards and a step-by-step approach to the intro-
duction of e-voting, including legal considerations. 
As discussed at the fourth review meeting of Rec(2004)11, the implementation of the Euro-
pean Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) in all EU Member States from 1 April 2012 produced a lively 
debate about new forms of e-participation. This happened for example in Austria where the 
parties represented in parliament discussed a far-reaching “democracy package". Further-
more, the regulatory framework for the ECI (European Union, 2011a and 2011b) provides an 
interesting example of a legal regulation completed by technical specifications, including 
references to technical standards developed by other organisations such as the ISO 27000 
family of norms. The regulation applies to e-collecting systems but presents an approach 
which is interesting from the standpoint of regulating e-voting systems as well. 
The recently published ODIHR (2013) Handbook for the observation of new voting technolo-
gies crystallises current know-how on the issue and offers a detailed method for observing 
and evaluating e-voting. According to the Handbook, ODIHR's assessment of NVT is based on 
OSCE commitments for democratic elections and on Rec(2004)11 and its additional devel-
opments. Given the high-level nature of OSCE commitments, Rec(2004)11 would be the right 
regulatory instrument provided it is updated to reflect recent developments and lessons 
learned, including by observing e-voting. The ODIHR and other organisations' contributions 
on e-voting are a good starting point when considering an update of the Recommendation. 
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3. FIRST OPTION: UPDATE OF REC(2004) 11 
3.1 Background  
3.1.1 Critical assessments and proposals for update 
We already identified the need to update the Recommendation in the light of its application. 
Below we will present some critical assessments of Rec(2004)11 and concrete proposals for 
update. 
Jones 2004 
Jones (2004) compares the Recommendation to the U.S. non-binding voluntary federal vot-
ing systems standards (Voluntary Voting System Guidelines or VVSG). As "nothing prevents 
states from writing them into law...if a sufficient number do so, the nonbinding nature of 
these standards could change without the cooperation of their authors". 
Jones conducts a detailed review of the Recommendation which, in addition to many useful 
ideas, according to him "suffers from some serious deficiencies, mostly in the appendices that 
contain the actual standards". Each critique is accompanied with proposals for solution and 
advice on how to improve the recommendation.  
The requirement that e-voting should be as secure as non-electronic voting systems is prob-
lematic for Jones because there exist no widely accepted metrics for this. In addition, the 
risks that e-enabled elections face are different from those encountered by traditional voting 
methods (Jones calls them "retail fraud" for non-e-voting and "wholesale fraud" for e-voting 
referring to the impact that fraud may have on the results). This flaws the comparison be-
tween the two. In our view this is the most important critique he makes and it needs to be 
addressed in a future update (the other ones being more easily implementable/answerable).  
After discussing voting absolute or relative privacy he concludes that "The choice between 
these two models of voter privacy should be viewed as a matter of public policy, not of voting 
technology. Technological arguments that purport to show that a given technology for condi-
tional privacy is strong enough to be trustworthy should be taken as arguments to change 
the law to permit a conditional model, not as arguments for the use of technology offering 
conditional privacy in jurisdictions where the law calls for absolute privacy". We couldn't 
agree more with this conclusion as it also supports what we said before with respect to mul-
tiple voting. However Jones does not follow his own advice when he recommends the intro-
duction of multiple voting to deal with coercion without mentioning that this is a broader 
issue of remote voting from uncontrolled environments policy and that the introduction of 
multiple internet voting affects other voting channels. 
Another important point is his critique on the use of terms such as verification and verifiabil-
ity in the Recommendation. Any future update should pay attention to terms and to the spe-
cific meaning of the same term when used in different contexts (e.g. electoral law, software 
development or systems' control). Even for terms that are used in one context alone (legal 
terms such as vote secrecy), attention should be paid to distinguish between different ways 
to implement the same term in different countries, as the discussion about absolute and 
relative or conditional secrecy shows.  
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McGaley, Gibson 2006 
McGaley and Gibson present a critical analysis of Rec(2004)11 (McGaley and Gibson, 2006). 
They do not consider the merits of the standards included in the Recommendation. They use 
engineering requirements and reverse engineering techniques to show that standards are 
expressed in a poor way. The same techniques are then used to make a first, simple, restruc-
turing of the Recommendation.  
They highlight that the Recommendation as it stands makes certification against standards 
difficult. The use of engineering techniques is interesting given the challenge of regulating a 
domain at the cross-roads of law and technology. Their advice is to start by stating more 
explicitly the requirements that the standards should meet, then to re-write the standards in 
order to better meet these requirements. With respect to the management and mainte-
nance of these standards, they recommend the CoE to broaden the membership to include 
experts in technology, science, engineering and mathematics.  
Several "original flaws" (in the view of a software engineer) of Rec(2004)11 are discussed: 
consistency, completeness and scope, over specification, under specification, redundancy 
and repetition, maintainability and extensibility. A first-step restructuring, rooting out the 
identified original flaws is proposed with operational standards and technical requirements 
(appendixes II and III of the recommendation) grouped in a logical manner under each of the 
five rights identified in appendix I (legal standards) of the Recommendation. The restructur-
ing required several decisions to be made such as splitting, merging, rephrasing, contradict-
ing, adding and excluding individual recommendations.  
Their aim is to show that the Recommendation as it stands is flawed according to standard 
software engineering practices. They fear this "could lead to "bad" systems being certified 
and "good" systems failing". They conclude that a "broadly applicable instrument would be 
genuinely useful both to governments procuring e-voting systems, and to vendors developing 
and maintaining such systems". They also recommend that "the successful development of 
standards for e-voting systems will require the input of experts in technology, science, engi-
neering and mathematics". 
Ehringfeld et al. 2010 
Ehringfeld et al. (2010) question the possibility for the 2004 Recommendation to handle suf-
ficiently real-world attacks against elections using e-voting. Edwards Deming's Plan-Do-
Check-Act Cycle is employed to improve upon Rec(2004)11. 
Under this perspective the Recommendation is considered (as being or ought be) specific 
enough as to provide detailed solutions to deal with specific threats such as skilled, creative, 
personally motivated and appropriately equipped students planning and executing attacks 
such as distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS), phishing with mock e-voting system, 
vote flipping video, vote buying campaign and unknown social engineering attack.  
For each of these attacks, countermeasures are explained and put in relation with 
Rec(2004)11 recommendations. Identified gaps in the Recommendation are analyzed and 
conclusions drawn. The authors propose that Rec(2004)11 be further improved by explicitly 
pointing out the necessity of implementing adequate countermeasures to different types of 
attacks and that the development of a special security strategy to deal with attacks that tar-
get voters' acceptance of e-voting should be recommended in Rec(2004)11. Finally aware-
ness programmes, trained staff, and well-designed processes are considered necessary to 
deal with social engineering and this could be included in the recommendation. 
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Barrat, Goldsmith 2012 
While studying the compliance of the Norwegian internet voting system with international 
standards, Barrat and Goldsmith (2012b) encountered some difficulties in applying the re-
quirements of Rec(2004)11. This prompted them to present a critical assessment of the Rec-
ommendation. Their arguments can be summarized as follows: 
• the Recommendation does not build on existing public international law, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols or the Venice Commission 
decisions; 
• it says little on the legal basis, trying, on the contrary, to cover every possible situa-
tion in a technologically neutral way;  
• the Recommendation aims at designing standards applicable to all circumstances, to 
different voting channels and different stages of the electoral process whose com-
mon point is that they rely on IT. But such a broad scope is problematic when it 
comes to their implementation; 
• the Recommendation ignores the fact that trade-offs between standards are some-
times necessary in electronic voting, such as the need for secret voting against the 
need for transparency, and the need to be able to audit the function of the voting 
system. The need to comply with the Recommendation as a whole is problematic; 
• a number of standards may appear to be overlapping or redundant; 
• vague wording makes the enforcement of the Recommendation more difficult than it 
should be. Interpretation is sometime needed; 
• in some cases, the wording appears too detailed; 
• mixing different issues of reliability and security in one recommendation is problem-
atic; 
• the recommendations are technically neutral in their wording, but not in their conse-
quences when attempting to comply. 
The authors affirm that compared to 2004, our knowledge has importantly increased, espe-
cially with respect to internet voting. The e-voting environment along with the way in which 
we interact with it has changed significantly too, thus implying that an update of 
Rec(2004)11 is necessary. 
It may seem contradictory that some authors argue for an exhaustive list of requirements to 
help vendors to build "good" systems as well as certification authorities to examine them 
(McGaley, Gibson) while others are concerned about the ambition of the Recommendation 
to exhaustively regulate technical aspects of e-voting (Barrat, Goldsmith) which are too rigid 
when one thinks of the need for compromise. In our view this apparent contradiction stems 
from the lack of completeness and the lack of consistency of the recommendations. The fol-
lowing two points must be observed in a future update. First, the Rec(2004)11 must be as 
high level as to be applicable everywhere in the region. It should include all legal principles 
(European common heritage) for democratic elections applicable to all voting channels. Sec-
ond, the Recommendation should present a complete and consistent set of standards.  
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Other work 
Important work has been realized on the technical aspects of e-voting such as e-voting pro-
tocols, e-voting control and certification or e-voting increased transparency through crypto-
graphic solutions. The consideration of such work in the light of Rec(2004)11 goes beyond 
the scope of this report. However these developments and their significance for the Rec-
ommendation need to be studied in view of the updating work.  
As early as 2004 Jones mentioned in its critique to Rec(2004)11 the existence of experimen-
tal e-voting systems "that prove to the voter, in the privacy of the voting booth, that the re-
ceipt contains their vote, but they do not provide, to the voter, sufficient information to prove 
to anyone else how they voted, using that receipt". Such research is ongoing. The results are 
published in the specialized literature. Proceedings of periodical conferences such as Bre-
genz EVOTE, EVT/Wote6, and Vote-ID7 give a good overview of such developments.  
Participants at the Dagstuhl Conference on Frontiers of E-Voting in 2007 adopted the 
"Dagstuhl Accord8" which argues in favour of the development of E2E voting systems which 
"allow each voter to ensure that his or her vote cast in the booth is recorded correctly. They 
then allow anyone to verify that all such recorded votes are included in the final tally cor-
rectly. ...Typically through use of encryption, these systems can also provide privacy of votes. 
They do this without introducing any danger of “improper influence” of voters, as in vote buy-
ing and coercion. Moreover, such systems offer all these properties without relying on trust in 
particular persons, manual processes, devices, or software". 
Following Norway, Estonia has declared introducing an E2E verifiable internet system for the 
October 2013 municipal elections. Switzerland has recently modified legislation to allow for 
second generation systems offering E2E verifiability to be developed already in 2014. Bel-
gium has taken a similar approach by introducing VVPAT. The Recommendation could be 
updated to provide basic requirements for such new verifiability concepts. 
Another interesting development from a regulatory point of view is work on certification, 
including formal certification of e-voting systems. Contributions in this area (e.g. Volkamer, 
2009) need to be considered.  
3.1.2 Other lessons learned  
Netherlands discontinued all forms of e-voting because, beyond the technical considerations 
and problems of radiation of voting machines, "the embedding of the voting machines within 
the legal framework was very weak" (Loeber, 2008). Another lesson from the Netherlands is 
that technical choices made in the past to embed basic principles of elections need to be 
periodically reconsidered. This is valid for e-voting regulation in general in our view. 
National courts have played an important role in clarifying conditions for e-voting use, espe-
cially in Germany and Austria. The German Constitutional Court demanded verifiability for 
electronic voting in its voting computer decision of 3 March 2009. Jurisprudence, especially 
of higher Courts, and its implications at the regulatory level need to be carefully considered 
while updating of the Recommendation. 
                                                     
6 https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote13 
7 http://www.voteid13.org/ 
8 http://www.dagstuhlaccord.org/index.php . The signatories include renowened technical specialists of e-
voting such as Chaum, Kutylowski, Rivest, Ryan etc. 
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A U.S. report (CALTECH/MIT 2012) provides an insight on lessons learned with e-voting in the 
U.S. since 2000. The report considers (federal) voting system standards as being useful for 
examining the basic functionality, usability, reliability, and elementary security aspects of 
voting machines. The report however notes that several conflicts have become apparent in 
recent years regarding voting systems standards in the U.S. such as "a desire for high integ-
rity in voting systems, versus the fact that testing and certification cannot ensure secure vot-
ing systems... security is a negative quality. You can test that a voting machine weighs at 
most 80 pounds, but you cannot test that a voting machine is “secure“...Even the best-tested 
equipment can be misused to yield invalid election outcomes; post-election audits are capa-
ble of detecting and correcting such problems". The report concludes that "while (standards) 
may have helped ensure that voting systems meet some basic requirements, the difficulty, 
cost, and time involved in having voting systems certified have certainly also made life diffi-
cult for new voting system vendors and election officials". This is the reason why the report 
recommends a switch from certification to auditing. Similar arguments are heard in Europe 
as well where the cost-efficiency of certification has been questioned and individual and 
universal verifiability is seen as offering better guarantees while at the same time being less 
costly than certification. 
3.2 Purpose of the update 
3.2.1 Meet stakeholders' needs 
We already identified several arguments in favour of an update of Rec(2004)11. Behind each 
argument there is at least one stakeholder with a direct interest in the update. It's necessary 
to clearly identify them. 
Stakeholders include member States' governments as well as national legislators. Industry is 
very much interested in working with up-to-date standards and in building systems that can 
be certified and used. The control and certifying authorities as well. Research has an inter-
est. Finally the major stakeholder, the voter, has a clear interest that all voting systems, in-
cluding e-enabled ones, respect the principles of democratic elections. 
Among the voters, some categories may have an increased interest in e-voting and in the 
fact that it becomes a sustainable solution. These include the visually impaired, people with 
reduced mobility, expatriates, people on mission abroad (military) etc. Their needs have to 
be identified and dealt.  
As already seen, needs and expectations may vary in time due to a number of factors, includ-
ing social and technological developments. As a result, needs cannot be satisfied once and 
for all. Periodic updates of the Recommendation are necessary. 
3.2.2 Address weaknesses 
What should the update address? We would say that first of all it should address the so-
called congenital weaknesses, taking into account critical assessments and proposals. Sec-
ondly, it should examine and reflect recent developments and new concepts and ideas, be 
they technological, legal or social, in the CoE countries. Thirdly, it should benefit from ex-
periences, and where existing, guidelines on e-voting from implementing bodies, observers, 
researchers etc. in the CoE region and elsewhere. Fourthly it should take into account les-
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sons learned by countries outside the CoE region. And an update should of course produce a 
document that can be easily used by the different stakeholders. 
3.3 Expertise required  
3.3.1 Combined expertise  
As already mentioned, the multi-disciplinary nature of e-voting requires combined expertise 
from different areas. Recent developments have provided enough evidence that the in-
volvement of ICT experts in particular is needed. 
A report of the Dutch Government to the Parliament (CoE, 2012) underscored the lessons 
learnt from the abolition of e-voting in 2006 and observed that sets of election criteria can-
not be static and rather need to be repeatedly updated. These specifications, it was pro-
posed, should be developed largely by independent experts. 
3.3.2 Role of periodical review meetings  
The biennial review cycle of Rec(2004)11 is meant for recommendations and updates to be 
discussed in detail. However, the bulk of the work needs to be conducted by experts who 
will most probably meet more frequently (physically or virtually). Work done by the experts 
must be presented to and validated by member States' representatives at biennial meetings. 
Biennial review meetings are important and fulfil their mandate as long as they have an ac-
tive role in the updating of the Recommendation. If no update is proposed, if there is no fol-
low-up on countries' experiences and lessons learnt the Recommendation will gradually be-
come obsolete and biennial meetings would lose their substance. 
4. SECOND OPTION: NO UPDATE OF REC(2004) 11 
4.1 Alternative standards? 
We will not speculate on the theoretical possibility for other organisations to provide legal 
standards on e-voting. So far, we have seen that organisations involved with e-voting have 
been focusing on formalizing procedures (e-voting introduction, observation and so on) and 
on identifying good practices. Formalized procedures and methodologies have been domain 
specific (directed to election officials, observers and so on) and do not aim at providing the 
regulatory framework for e-voting. They need to be taken into account when updating the 
Recommendation but they are not equivalent to it (e.g. in their respective scopes) and no 
substitute to it. The main reason being that no other institution has a mandate equivalent to 
the CoE in this area, at least in Europe.  
CoE's mandate in the voting area derives from its purpose to safeguard "spiritual and moral 
values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual 
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine 
democracy" (CoE, 1949). Indeed the aim of the CoE as laid out in article 1 of its Statute is "to 
achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising ... 
principles which are their common heritage...This aim shall be pursued...by agreements and 
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common action in ...legal and administrative matters". Article 15 of the CoE Statue foresees 
that action may take the form of recommendations to the governments of members.  
4.2 Council of Europe's expertise 
As mentioned in the previous chapters CoE's Recommendation is largely referenced and 
CoE's expertise in this area is recognised.  
The participants at the fourth review meeting "concurred that a decision to update the Rec-
ommendation would be decisive in the deliberation as to whether the Council of Europe 
wishes to remain or not a widely recognised and cutting-edge actor in the field of e-voting, 
being the only entity capable of setting international standards in this significant aspect of 
democratic governance, i.e. in an area of core competence of the Organisation. Indeed, the 
continuation of standard-setting work in the field of e-voting would be fully in line with the 
Council of Europe’s ‘Strategy on Internet Governance 2012-2015’ (doc. CM(2011)175 final, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers in March 2012, reference to e-voting in paragraph 
13.c)" (CoE, 2012). 
Ultimately the question is not whether or not to update the Recommendation. The true 
question for the CoE is whether it wishes to continue work in this field or not. If the CoE 
wishes to maintain its position as a reference in this area, the above mentioned evidence 
provides a solid foundation for a decision to update the Recommendation. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The questions we asked at the beginning were: How has Rec(2004)11 been implemented so 
far? Has un update become necessary? How to proceed with the necessary update? The 
three questions have been answered throughout the report. Below we will further develop 
some recommendations on how to tackle the updating work. 
Implementation? 
If we compare Rec(2004)11 to the U.S. VVSG (U.S. EAC 2005) it's clear that their structure 
and language is very different. Both are voluntary guidelines. However, if adopted, VVSG 
provide a check-list ready for use by authorities, vendors, certifying bodies, etc., while 
Rec(2004)11 was intended to provide guidance, although some parts of it are too detailed 
for such a purpose.  
So the first question before undertaking a thorough update of the Recommendation should 
be to decide what kind of document we want? In the light of experiences made and lessons 
learned so far it can be assumed that a readily implementable (by authorities as well as by 
industry) check-list will receive greater attention. This decision will influence the structure, 
content and wording of the entire Recommendation.  
The level of detail of the Recommendation needs special attention. It should include all in-
ternational standards for democratic elections applicable to all voting systems, while leaving 
individual countries the necessary room for implementing their own electoral specificities, of 
course in accordance with the broader international standards. The check-list should be 
comprehensive and coherent to facilitate implementation and control, but must be limited 
to what is strictly necessary to ensure compliance of e-voting with international standards 
for democratic elections. Countries have of course the possibility to do more and to do bet-
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ter. By comparaison, in a federal context such approach would be characterized "as central-
ized as necessary, as decentralized as possible". The aim is to keep costs, for example for 
system certification towards the requirements of the Recommendation, as low as possible.  
Another prior determination would be to clearly distinguish between e-voting in controlled 
and e-voting in uncontrolled environments. Requirements and standards in the Recommen-
dation should clearly indicate to which of the two types of e-voting they apply. 
Update? 
Experiences, technical developments, academic reviews, all indicate that an update of the 
Recommendation is currently necessary. The major challenge is to identify a comprehensive 
set of international requirements for democratic elections applicable to all voting channels 
and to map it with specific requirements for e-voting in controlled and in uncontrolled envi-
ronments. 
A management and maintenance policy for the Recommendation is needed. Experts from 
different disciplines such as law, engineering, mathematics etc. must be involved in the 
maintenance work. Their proposals should be validated by member States' representatives 
before being presented to the Committee of Ministers with the request to formally update 
the Recommendation. 
There may be a risk that the update of the Recommendation is seen as an opportunity to re-
open Pandora’s box in the sense of re-discussing everything. An update being a further de-
velopment of issues that factually command an update, it does not challenge the fundamen-
tals. It is up to the body responsible for mandating the update to define such fundamentals 
and accordingly delimitate the scope of the update of Rec(2004)11. 
How to proceed with the update? 
If work in 2004 started from a theoretical perspective, updating work in 2014 definitely has 
to start by considering practical needs of administrations, voters, industry and other stake-
holders.  
The initial enthusiasm for e-voting from 2004 has given way to more lucidity and maturity in 
the consideration of risks and opportunities. Today's understanding of IT and e-voting should 
be duly taken into account in the updating process.  
At the end of the day, ensuring verifiable e-voting requires not just state-of-the-art technical 
solutions but first and foremost state-of-the-art legal regulations to support them and this is 
the primary reason for, and ultimate goal of, an update. 
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